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The Underground War:
Military Mining Operations in
support of the attack on Vimy
Ridge, 9 April 1917
Major Michael Boire

Introduction

Background

T

he infantry subways, however, are only a
part of the underground story of the
Canadian Corps' operations against the
enormously powerful German fortress on Vimy
Ridge. A stone's throw away from the Grange
Tunnel separating the concrete-sandbagged
German and Canadian forward outpost lines
are the well-manicured remains of the Duffield,
Grange and Birkin crater groups. 1 They are
but a small fraction of the scores of craters
produced by the German, French and British
mining operations on the ridge during two
years of near constant fighting.

his article aims briefly to describe the
significance and evolution of military
mining as a battlefield tactic during the Great
War, with special reference to the role these
underground operations played in the greatest
success of Canadian arms - the capture of
Vimy Ridge.
No military historian's visit to Vimy Ridge,
this country's most symbolic and emotionladen battlefield, would be complete without a
stop at the Grange Tunnel, an infantry subway
dug during the winter and spring of 1916-1917
by the soldier-miners of 172 Tunnelling
Company, Royal Engineers. They were ably
assisted by work parties from all four veteran
battalions of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division's
7th Brigade: The Black Watch (42 Battalion),
The Royal Canadian Regiment, Princess
Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and the
Edmonton Regiment (49 Battalion).
Tunnel guides explain how this cool, humid,
subterranean passage, hurriedly burrowed into
the compacted flint and chalk of an Artois hill,
was part of a 13-tunnel underground labyrinth.
It protected the assaulting infantry battalions
of the Canadian Corps from the terrible and
ever-present dangers of German bombardment
as they made their final move from their reserve
trenches in the rear, forward to their assembly
trenches in the very front of the Canadian line.

T

The first battle of the Artois in 1915 saw the
French 10th Army begin a slow, stubborn yearlong advance up the ridge which ended in
February 1916 when, urgently needed to stem
the German onslaught at Verdun, it was relieved
by the 17th Corps of the British Third Army,
commanded by Lieut.-General Sir Julian Byng,
a figure soon to be well-known to the Canadian
Corps. No sooner had this aggressive formation
of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) settled
in to brave the hardships of a cold, wet Artois
spring when it faced a hurricane of mine
explosions which were carefully, violently and
successfully orchestrated by the German
defenders to throw the newly arrived force
back down the slopes of the ridge. It was
during the month of October 1916 that the
British troops at the base of the ridge were
relieved by the Canadian Corps, or what was
15
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left of it after its bloody journey across the
killing fields of the Somme.

perceived to be the only way of achieving a clear
decision in the field.

Mining operations are a fundamental, but
seldom explored element of the French, British
and Canadian battles for the ridge. The old
craters which remain in that small wellpreserved piece of no man's land are silent
witnesses to great battles lost and won. These
mine craters are more than just deep holes in
the ground produced by the detonation of
enormous amounts of high explosive; they
represent the vestiges of a particular form of
warfare, already thousands of years old when
war was declared in 1914. During this conflict,
m i n i n g t e c h n i q u e s were r e s u r r e c t e d ,
modernized and vigorously applied by both
sides. Aggressive mining characterized trench
warfare during the middle two years of World
War One, especially in the active sectors of the
Western Front. 2 On Vimy Ridge, commanders
at all levels employed mines to seize the
initiative, to dominate terrain and to inflict
casualties, with a view to creating a local
tactical advantage.

In addition to improving the accuracy and
lethality of their respective artillery, as well as
developing the destructive potential of chemical
weapons, both sides resurrected the mining
techniques which had proven so effective in
breaching fixed defences during the complicated
siege operations which characterized so many
of the European campaigns of the 18th and
19th centuries. These technical solutions to
the tactical problem of stalemate in the trenches
evolved unevenly on both sides of no man's
land as the conflict wore on. 3

Manoeuvre warfare on the Western Front
came to an end in the late autumn of 1914. By
the time the race to the sea ended in November,
both sides had run out of open flanks to turn,
strategic envelopment was now impossible. It
became clear to both warring camps that,
without the possibility of manoeuvre, the
chances of obtaining a clear decisive victory on
the Western Front were increasingly remote.
The belligerents squared off against each other
from positions of increasing strength along a
400-mile corridor from the Franco-Swiss border
to the Channel port of Flanders. Technological
improvements in the delivery of firepower, the
failure of tactical doctrine, very heavy casualties
and acute shortages of ammunition left both
sides with no option but to consolidate their
positions and settle into a positional style of
warfare for which their pre-war training had
left them totally unprepared.
Developing
solutions to the problem of tactical stalemate
with a view to restoring manoeuvre on the
battlefield became u r g e n t priorities for
commanders and staffs on both sides of the
wire.
Reestablishing open warfare was

Demonstrating the talent for innovation
which characterized its operations throughout
the conflict, the German Army seized the
initiative and went underground, scoring its
first tactical success against the British at
Festubert (20 km north of Vimy), j u s t before
Christmas 1914. There, German tunnellers
detonated ten mines under forward positions
manned by an Indian Brigade and destroyed
over a thousand yards of densely occupied
trenches. Morale was so shaken by the surprise
and violence of the attack that the entire Indian
Corps had to be withdrawn into Army reserve
to rest and recover. Underground, the Germans
kept up the pressure; the relentless attacks
continued without pause and the morale of the
BEF plummeted. 4
The psychological impact of German mining
was devastating. British soldiers in the front
lines could actually hear the German miners
coming at them. The noise of their picks and
shovels carried for long distances underground,
as did the sounds they made while placing
their explosives charges under British forward
positions. Soldiers felt they had no defence
against the terrible, inevitable fate of being
buried alive or blown apart by a sudden
thundering explosion coming up at them from
the bowels of the earth. 5 By the spring of 1915,
it had become difficult for the British infantry
commanders to keep their soldiers in the front
lines of sectors where German miners were
known to be active. 6

16

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol1/iss1/3

2

Boire: Military Mining Operations in Support of the Attack on Vimy Ridge

The Duffield, Grange and Birkin Crater Groups, now preserved and manicured. The entrance to the Grange
Tunnel is on the left.
Struggling to regain the initiative, the BEF
attempted to stop the German underground
offensive but its efforts were ineffective. As
senior British commanders soon realized, Royal
Engineer units at brigade and division level
were short of soldiers trained in mining as well
as the necessary officer expertise to direct
operations from underground. Time was
running short and prompt decisive action was
required. The BEF was being blown out of its
trenches and could do little to defend itself.
Informed of this deteriorating situation and
acting on the advice of several notable
personalities within the British mining industry
who were concerned by the inertia of senior
British military leadership, 7 Lord Kitchener,
the Secretary of State for War, approved the
immediate recruitment and deployment of
specialized tunnelling companies to the Western

Front. The organization, training and tactical
employment of these companies were to be the
responsibility of the Royal Engineers. Wherever
possible they were to be composed entirely of
professional miners who could be recruited
and organized where they worked.
The formation of these new Royal Engineer
tunnelling companies began during the winter
of 1914-1915 and was treated as an urgent
priority by the War Office. In the coalfields and
pit mines of Britain and the Dominions, mining
engineers and geologists volunteered to become
the company and platoon commanders. Mining
foremen with a taste for adventure were found
and promoted to senior NCO rank. They would
become the shift supervisors underground.
Those miners, declared to be surplus to the
war effort at home, were encouraged to join
17
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these new, secret "underground" organizations.
Sometimes events moved very quickly. One
tunnelling company was recruited and formed
on a Thursday morning in Yorkshire and was
underneath German forward positions in
Flanders the following Wednesday afternoon. 8
Once at the front, the plan was simple. After
a very short period of military training these
companies would be rushed to the sectors
where their expertise was most needed. Initially
they would defend the BEF against enemy
mines by destroying the Germans underground
in their own tunnels, before they could plant
their mines beneath friendly positions. This
tactic was labelled defensive mining and
depended upon tunnellers quickly finding
enemy tunnels and then collapsing them with
small explosive charges called camoufiets.
Having n e u t r a l i z e d the enemy's efforts
underground, British miners would then push
their own tunnels forward underneath German
positions, thereby regaining the initiative
(offensive mining). The Germans had to be
stopped underground if the British and French
were to remain in the war.
The i n t r o d u c t i o n of Royal E n g i n e e r
tunnelling companies, composed of welltrained and highly-motivated professional
miners, to the Western Front was initially
welcomed by commanders in the field, but it
was staunchly resisted by the uppermost
echelons of the BEF who "were unenthusiastic
about taking in some hundreds of miners
with no military training at all and [who had]
a r e p u t a t i o n for fierce independence." 1 0
Despite these reservations, the underground
menace posed such a serious threat to the
BEF that the shared perception amongst the
senior commanders was that only resolute,
effective and coordinated action could defeat
it.
To e n s u r e economy of effort and
concentration of force, tunnelling companies
w e r e c e n t r a l i z e d a t Army level a n d
commanded by a Royal Engineer colonel who
carried the title, "Controller of Mines". This
officer provided technical advice to his army
commander and assigned mining priorities
in t h e A r m y ' s a r e a of o p e r a t i o n s in
consultation with the commander's staff and

according to the commander's operational plan.
Further up the chain of command was the
"Inspector of Mines" stationed at HQ BEF. This
officer of general rank allocated companies to
armies according to operational priorities
established by the commander of the British
Expeditionary Force. 11
A total of 33 companies of tunnellers was
deployed to the Western Front in the summer
of 1916. The Commonwealth was well
represented in the British Army Mining Service
with one New Zealand, three Canadian and
three Australian companies serving alongside
their Imperial counterparts. When at full
strength, a company could field 500-600 miners
and was often reinforced by fatigue parties
drawn from infantry battalions in reserve
(always a popular job with tired soldiers). With
attachments, company strengths were often
well into four figures, as was the case with 172
Company while it dug the Grange Tunnel from
November 1916 to March 1917. 12
In 1915, British mining operations on the
Western Front were limited in scope and
essentially defensive. Digging was restricted to
shallow tunnels, seldom surpassing 100 yards
long and 20 feet deep. The charges were also
small, r a r e l y exceeding 1 0 , 0 0 0 l b s . 1 3
Gunpowder and gun cotton, though far too
sensitive to enemy fire, were the only explosives
available in great quantity. Many miners
perished when the explosives bags they were
carrying were hit by small arms fire or shrapnel.
Throughout 1915 the Germans maintained
the momentum they had initiated during the
a u t u m n of 1914 t h o u g h t h e p r e s e n c e
underground of unfriendly miners from the
BEF caused them to be much more circumspect,
as the tunnellers' war diaries testify.14
Without doubt 1916 was the most active
year of the underground war. When the last of
the tunnelling companies was recruited and
deployed in early summer, the 33 companies
could field 24,000 miner-soldiers. Digging
techniques had improved to the point where
miners could push tunnels deep underneath
the enemy at a rate of 20 feet a day, soil
conditions permitting. Underground listening
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devices had been developed which could
accurately detect German tunnelling up to 100
yards away. 15
Ammonal, a new and powerful explosive,
could be safely handled and transported, even
under fire. It was used in huge quantities and
produced impressive results. A new French
invention, le cordeau detonant ("det cord" in
Canadian field engineer parlance), assured a
reliable alternate means of exploding heavy
mine charges, which by this time were being
measured in tons of explosives.
During t h a t same year the tunnelling
companies exploded a total of 750 mines along
the front line of the BEF. The Germans
answered with 696 devices of their own.16 In
the Arras sector, which included Vimy Ridge,
ten Royal Engineer tunnelling companies dug
thousands of yards of shafts, exploding well
over 100 large mines underneath or close to
German positions. The majority of the craters
still visible today near the Grange Tunnel were
fired during 1916. The tide was turning. On
the ridge, as in other sectors of the Western
Front, the Germans were losing the initiative,
and were not to regain it.

While British companies were busy on Vimy
Ridge, No.l Canadian Tunnelling company
began digging underneath Saint Eloi. It was to
be the longest mine shaft to date (1,650 feet),
at the greatest depth (125 feet) and after 9
months of dangerous work contained the
biggest charge of the war (95,600 lbs of
Ammonal). It was exploded, along with 18
other large mines (a total of 1,000,000 lbs of
Ammonal) as part of the Messines offensive in
J u n e 1917.
At the end of 1916, pressures on the German
war economy had forced the recall of 125,000
miners from the Army to reinforce the industrial
effort at home; 50,000 more men followed in
J u n e 1917. 18 As these men were not replaced,
enemy underground activity dropped off
dramatically. Furthermore, the new German
defensive doctrine introduced in December
1916, called for the creation of multiple and
mutually supporting defensive belts thickened
with n u m e r o u s strongpoints.
Thus the
deployment of the German Army in much
greater depth pushed many attractive enemy
targets well back from no man's land, effectively
placing them out of range of BEF tunnellers. 19
In comparison to the previous
year, 1917 was relatively quiet;
117 British mines were detonated,
as compared to 106 German
charges. 20 The war underground
had become, at best, a series of
skirmishes. As a result, from
November of 1916 onwards, far
fewer tunnelling companies were
r e q u i r e d to face t h e rapidly
decreasing German menace
underground. Consequently, more
miners could be employed digging
infantry subways, which was the
case in the Vimy sector.
By the beginning of 1917, the
BEF had won the war underground
but not without paying a steep
price in soldier-miners.
An aerial view
trenches at Vimy.

of the reconstructed
(NAC PA 183533)
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Under Vimy Ridge

T

he staff of the Canadian Corps began
planning for the monumental task of
seizing Vimy Ridge on 21 November 1916,
while the last remnants of the Corps were
finishing the long march from the battlefields
of the Somme Valley to the hills of the Artois.21
From the beginning of the preparation process,
planners at all levels came to grips with
numerous and seemingly insurmountable
problems. To their everlasting credit they
solved all of them. 22

To make good the losses of the Somme
campaign, where a quarter of its fighting
strength 23 had been lost, the Corps' infantry
battalions had to absorb and train thousands
of newly arrived reinforcements. In preparation
to equip, supply and maintain the front line
units before and during the battle ahead, the
Corps' engineer units began construction on
new r o a d s , sewage s y s t e m s , b a r r a c k s ,
ammunition dumps, water reservoirs, artillery
gun emplacements, trenches, tunnels and
dugouts.
An aggressive, effective and
t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d artillery
programme was developed to destroy the
h u n d r e d s of enemy strongpoints, trench
systems and barbed wire obstacles which would
put Canadian attackers at great risk. It would
not only protect Canadian infantry while they
closed with and destroyed the enemy, but
would silence enemy artillery during the attack
itself.24
Given the tactical stalemate, the lack of
manoeuvre room left planners with no choice
but to prepare an attack which took the form of
a determined simultaneous assault 25 by all
four of the Corps' infantry divisions advancing
abreast from their assembly trenches, across
the ridge, to the Douai Plain beyond. But as in
any attack, success in the initial stages would
be critical. Should the infantry be held up in
any way they would lose the protection of the
creeping barrage which would simply continue
on across the battlefield, at a marching pace,
without them.
With this in mind planners looked closely at
the enemy's fortified trench systems. Across
the 7,000 yards of Corps frontage, many

German strongpoints sheltered their machine
gun crews in deep artillery-proof dugouts which
would protect them from even the most
sustained bombardment by the Corps' heavy
artillery. Leaving these powerful positions
intact would permit those machine gunners to
inflict terrible casualties amongst the attacking
infantry battalions. How could these positions
be destroyed?
Given the successful conclusion of the
u n d e r g r o u n d c a m p a i g n of 1916, it is
understandable that the staff turned first to
the soldier-miners whose offensive mining
capability had produced much recent success.
As German activity underground had decreased
dramatically as 1916 drew to a close, it was
reasonable to expect there would be little
effective resistance to tunnelling operations
aimed at these strongpoints.
The brutal lessons of the Somme campaign
weighed heavily upon the Corps planners who
expressed a strong preference for expending
explosives and artillery shells rather than the
precious lives of Canadian infantrymen.
Consequently, initial attack planning called
for 26 German strongpoints, immediately in
front of the Corps front line, to be attacked with
mines. 26 In all four divisional areas, these
offensive mines were to be fired at Z-hour, the
very moment the attack was to be launched.
There was no intention of exploding any of
these charges before the main attack as had
been done near Beaumont Hamel on the first
morning of the Somme offensive. There the
detonation of the Hawthorne mine, though
destroying its intended target, had warned the
German defenders in adjacent sectors of the
line that a British attack was imminent.
At first, the Corps' staff appeared to be
mesmerized by what they perceived to be the
advantages to be realized from offensive mining.
In analyzing the 19 distinct mine crater groups
fired by the French, Germans, British and
Canadians in the four miles of no man's land
separating the combatants in the Vimy sector,
it was concluded that not one of these 19
groups constituted an insurmountable obstacle
to movement. However, the analysis did advise
that four of these crater groups should be
avoided as they had been blown in clay and as

20
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such were always full of water. 27 Clearly,
offensive operations through these areas would
inevitably bog down. However, the remaining
15 groups, most containing several deep craters,
were deemed to be "no obstacle" and as such
"easily traversable by small parties of men", 28 a
euphemism, perhaps, for attacking infantry
platoons.
In fairness, this conclusion was well
intentioned and based upon extensive and
balanced analysis. Officers of the Corps staff
had visited the La Boiselle - Fricourt sector of
the Somme battlefield, arguably one of the
most heavily-mined sectors of the Western
Front. There no man's land was filled by some
of the largest craters yet fired. Local British
commanders told the Canadian visitors that
these enormous holes posed no problems. They
were routinely navigated and traversed by
patrols and raiding parties from both sides.
Given the Corps staffs keen desire to use the
miners and in light of the favourable testimony
they had acquired in the field, the staff
minimized the potential obstacles which further
mining might cause assaulting Canadian
battalions as they launched their assault
towards the waiting Germans.
At the sharp end, where the bullets flew and
the shells exploded, the officers whose job it
was to lead their soldiers in the assault were no
longer confident t h a t mining was always
worthwhile. Though the tunnellers had turned
the tables on the Germans, thereby making
their own trenches safer places to live and
fight, three years of war had taught that while
mines could destroy strongpoints, their craters
became enormous obstacles to movement.
From the moment it arrived in the Vimy
sector, the Canadian Corps' raiding and
patrolling policy had been aggressive. 29 By the
month of March 1917 every assaulting battalion
had sent out many patrols into and across the
wire. Raiding parties had stormed into German
defenses to destroy trenches and dugouts as
well as to capture prisoners. Most operations
had been successful, though losses were
sometimes high, especially in 4 Division.30
Practical experience produced self-confidence.
Many junior infantry commanders had been
across no man's land and into the enemy's

front lines on more than one occasion. Their
frequent forays made them aware of the
difficulties caused by the existing crater groups.
Though it was a fact that craters could be
crossed or bypassed, any mine explosion could
cause more damage and create commensurately
harder going than had been foreseen. Infantry
commanders, as the attack grew near, balked
at the possibility of the Corps' mining plan
adding new and dangerous obstacles for them
to cross. 31
More to the point, they realized that the
infantry's survival depended on its ability to
stay close to the creeping barrage. This alone,
with its thunderous, destructive curtain of
high explosive, gas and shrapnel could keep
German heads down and away from their
weapons until the infantry could close with
and destroy them in their trenches and dugouts.
During raid after raid, platoons,
companies and sometimes entire battalions
had followed a barrage, manoeuvring j u s t
behind its deadly effects. What had been done
on numerous occasions since the Corps' arrival
in December 1916 could be accomplished on a
larger scale when it came time to face the
Germans at Z-hour. Creating further obstacles
to movement, however well-intentioned, was
definitely not welcome.
It was this perception, widespread among
Canadian infantry commanding officers and
solidly s u p p o r t e d by t h e i r formation
commanders, which caused some important
last-minute changes to the mining orders
contained in the final Canadian Corps Scheme
of Operations. Lieut.-General Sir Julian Byng,
the m u c h - r e s p e c t e d c o m m a n d e r of t h e
Canadian Corps, supported his subordinate
commanders and heeded their concerns on the
question of further mining. As a result, of 26
large mines of various types initially planned to
support the assault, 32 four were abandoned
due to technical difficulties, two were detonated
before 9 April for defensive purposes, five were
fired as planned, eight were prepared but not
used and seven others, though mentioned in
the earliest stages of planning do not appear in
subsequent tunnellers' war diaries as having
been undertaken. 33
21
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The development of mining operations in
4th Division's area leading up to the attack
appears to vindicate both the Corps' staff view
that mining was
a useful tool and
did have a viable
role in support of
offensive
operations; and
t h e front line
i n f a n t r y
perception that
mining was an
extremely risky
tactic
whose
results
were
at best
unpredictable and
at worst most
d a n g e r o u s to
t h o s e it w a s
designed
to
support,
the
infantry.

own formidable defences, Hill 145 was solidly
supported from the north by the guns of the
Pimple. Though the division had the shortest
a s s a u l t , never
more than 800
y a r d s deep in
any b a t t a l i o n
sector, it was
uphill all the way.
No one doubted
the enormity of
the task facing
4th
Division.
Therefore any
interference
coming
from
the
Pimple
would greatly
jeopardize the division's chances
of success. To
ensure its total
neutralization
before the attack,
a second deep
mine
was
planned
to
destroy
an
adjacent
and
Remnants of the Canadian Outpost Line, now preserved with
mutually supconcrete sandbags.
porting enemy

In t h i s divisional a r e a ,
four
major
mining
operations had been
planned.
The
most important
was abandoned
due purely to technical reasons, a second was
carried through to completion and achieved
the desired results and two were abandoned
without significant effect on the outcome of the
battle. 34
In the initial planning, a German redoubt
nicknamed the Pimple was earmarked for
destruction at Z-hour by a deep offensive mine. 34
This well-defended enemy position was built
into the chalk quarries of Givenchy-en-Gohelle
on the northern end of the ridge opposite the
British positions. It bristled with dozens of
machine guns whose fire dominated the
northern, western and eastern slopes of 4th
Division's objective, Hill 145. Of all the features
making up the ridge, Hill 145 was the highest,
tactically the most important and certainly the
most heavily fortified. Above and beyond its

position in le Bois de Givenchy, just north of
the Pimple.
Both mines were p a r t of the earliest
preparations for the attack. In a very real
sense both of these projects were inspired by
the 19 great mines which were at that time
being carefully laid underneath the German
defences on Messines Pudge, as part of the
Passchendaele offensive planned for later that
year in the Flanders sector. Unfortunately,
work on both mines was halted in the early
stages due to technical reasons. The Pimple
mine tunnel was being driven through a layer
of blue clay which, though deep under the
target, was dangerously shallow at the tunnel
face. During the first days of construction, a
barrage of friendly fire from the Corps' heavy
artillery, though aimed at German forward

22
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positions on the Pimple, fell far short and
landed squarely on top of the tunnel face,
collapsing it completely. Given the shallow
depth of the tunnel and the ever-increasing
weight of shellfire in that sector, work was
halted and the operation discontinued. Work
on the second Pimple mine was halted when it
became apparent that it would not be completed
in time. On the morning of the attack, that
tunnel was only 100 feet from its target. So
near yet so far.35
Had these two mines been completed and
fired the subsequent battle for Hill 145 might
have been far different. It is reasonable to
assume that the effect of these two massive
explosions on the Pimple would have had the
same effect on its defenders as the Messines
Ridge mines had on their victims: total
annihilation of the defenders and a walk-over
for the attackers. With its garrison neutralized,
the Pimple could not have offered organized
resistance. Hill 145 might have been outflanked
from the north by its attackers and would not
have wreaked the havoc it did on the battalions
of 11 Brigade. It would certainly have saved
many lives in 10 Canadian Infantry Brigade,
whosejob it was to seize the Pimple on 12 April.
Given the impossibility of dealing directly
with the Pimple's defences, they were masked
by an elaborate smoke and shrapnel barrage
during the opening phase of the attack. 36
However, the problem of securing 4th Division's
northern flank remained. To ensure that 12
Brigade's battalions were protected as they
took on the defenders of Hill 145, three mines
were laid and blown in the Kennedy crater
group on that formation's northern flank. The
mines went up as scheduled, burying and
killing many German defenders in the front
line and wrecking many yards of German mining
galleries underneath. 3 7 With debris from the
explosions still falling, the 73rd Battalion (The
Black Watch) dashed forward to seize the
farthest lips of the newly formed craters which
anchored the Brigade's strong defensive flank
guard which protected, in turn, the 72nd and
38th Battalions attacking to the south. Those
three mines had achieved the desired tactical
result.

Two other series of mines had been included
in the original plan but were dropped as the
attack drew near. The first, immediately to the
south of the Kennedy craters consisted of five
large mines which were to be fired under
enemy outposts built along the lips of existing
older craters in the German front line. 38 They
were a b a n d o n e d in deference to local
commanders' misgivings. Itwas over this piece
of ground that the 73rd's sister battalions, the
72nd and 38th, charged forward. The second
series, three mines in all, planted underneath
the older Broadmarsh crater on the boundary
between the 3rd and 4th Divisions was not
detonated, again due to local commanders'
objections. 39 The 54th and 102nd Battalions,
in 4 Division as well as the 42nd Battalion (The
Black Watch) in the 3rd Division traversed this
sector quickly, giving credence to the infantry's
concerns.
From its reappearance in 1914 when it had
shown so much promise as a means of restoring
mobility to the battlefield, to its great mining
offensive under Messines Ridge in 1917, military
mining had proven to be a classic doubleedged sword, as dangerous to friend as to foe.
The trench fighters of the Canadian Corps,
inhabiting a terrifying world of violent
bombardment, eerie calm and sudden death,
understood this reality and employed this old
yet adapted technique accordingly.
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